Negotiators' newsletter

Negotiators Newsletter 51 

Economic Proposal and selective offsets 

If you were hoping Frontier’s economic proposal would be a turning point in negotiations, think again. 

Management proposed an economic package that would make Frontier pilots the lowest paid narrowbody pilots in North America for the duration of the agreement. It is so woefully inadequate that even they have acknowledged its shortcomings.  
 
During recent airport sits, your Negotiating Committee heard directly from many of you about management’s economic proposal. The feedback was clear: pilots are pissed off, unimpressed, and unwilling to accept what’s on the table. We share that view.  Their proposal fails in every way, leaving pilots worse off than they are today. 

It’s a Cost-Control Document—Not a Contract Proposal 

When management presented their economic proposal, they weren’t thinking about pilots—they were thinking about?how to keep costs low, pilot loyalty optional, and career commitment unrewarded.  They weren’t just trying to save money. They were proposing a contract that?actively discourages pilots from building a career at Frontier, while punishing those who already have. 
 

• Their proposal increases Frontier’s labor cost advantage while?pretending to offer gains that are offset by having pilots work harder and reducing quality-of-life. 
   

• It reduces long-term commitments to its pilots by making changes to Monthly Guarantee and allowing for lower Average Line Values to reduce labor costs in the slower seasons. 
   

• It lacks wage growth and erodes quality-of-life provisions for Frontier’s most loyal pilots. 
   

• It provides no meaningful improvements for Reserves, the very pilots who keep the system running when the operation falls apart. 
   

Management’s proposal includes an early opener trigger that allows for renegotiation of wage rates only after four consecutive quarters of positive Free Cash Flow, a bogus metric, defined narrowly as cash from operating activities plus cash from investing activities. This proposed structure guarantees delays in wage improvements regardless of Frontier’s actual profitability or performance. It is a trigger designed to appear flexible while functioning as a stall tactic. It is especially telling that management proposes a five-year duration while tying future improvements to a benchmark they know the airline is unlikely to meet. In short, it is another unreachable mirage presented as progress. 
 
We are not here for optics. We are here for a contract that reflects the value Frontier pilots bring to this airline every day.  
 
 
The Reduction in Monthly Guarantee Is About One Thing: Saving Money in the Slow Season 
 
At the heart of management’s proposal is a calculated reduction in cost through?lowering the Monthly Guarantee and Average Line Value (ALV). While management promotes modest hourly pay increases, they simultaneously propose reducing the?Monthly Pay Guarantee?from?75 to 70 hours for Lineholders?and to?72 hours for Reserves. This isn’t just a bookkeeping change—it’s a deliberate cost-control maneuver designed to suppress income, particularly during the?slower months of the year. 

By lowering the guarantee and reducing ALV’s, management minimizes its labor costs when flying is light, which disproportionately hurts pilots’ pay during months when trips are already scarce. It also forces pilots to work more just to meet earnings that were previously guaranteed. The goal isn’t to align with the industry—it’s to?lock in structural savings at pilots’ expense. 

Twelve-Year First Officers See the Least—and Feel It the Most 

Let’s talk about the 12-year First Officers—the most experienced FOs at Frontier. These are pilots who have committed their careers to the airline through base closures, operational upheaval, and COVID recovery. Many have intentionally remained in their seats to prioritize?family, stability, and quality of life, structuring their schedules around being present for their children or supporting loved ones. And yet,?management’s proposal takes direct aim at them—offering minimal increases, reduced guarantees, and no meaningful return on their loyalty and commitment. 

Without a raise since?2023, and after years of steep inflation, management proposes increasing their hourly rate from?$179.26 to $186.45—a mere?$7.19/hour bump—while simultaneously?cutting their monthly guarantee from 75 to 70 hours: 

• Current monthly income: 75 × $179.26 =?$13,444.50 

• Proposed monthly income: 70 × $186.45 =?$13,051.50 

That is a?loss of nearly $400/month?for minimum-hour flyers—many of whom are exactly the pilots that management should be interested in rewarding: experienced, reliable, and deeply committed to Frontier and our profession. 
 
This proposal isn’t just economically hollow. It’s a rejection of the very values pilots expect their employer to support;?stability, balance, and earned respect.  

Reserve Pilots Are Getting Left Behind 

Management’s proposal offers junior pilots a raise in name only. Specifically, a?Second-Year First Officer on Reserve: their hourly rate goes from?$118.74 to $131.82, and their monthly guarantee drops from?75 to 72 hours. 

• Current pay: 75 × $118.74 =?$8,905.50/month 

• Proposed pay: 72 × $131.82 =?$9,489.04/month 

That’s an increase of just?$583/month with?no hard days off and?no early release on the last day in a block of RDP’s. 

It’s a weak offer in the best-case scenario—but it gets worse when you remember while reserve has been a relatively short-lived experience in our recent memory; pilots have historically stayed on reserve for years. There was a time when?First Officers remained on Reserve for 6 to 8 years, that reality can return fast, especially during economic slowdowns or hiring lulls. And yet, management’s proposal makes no serious investment in this part of the pilot group. Instead, it keeps Reserve pilots cheap and flexible. It’s a short-sighted strategy that punishes the very pilots who make the operation possible during irregular ops, holiday surges, and last-minute coverage. 
 
Drop/Swap and Frontier Pilot Culture 

Every pilot group negotiates contract provisions that reflect the?unique values, priorities, and culture of their membership. Whether it’s Market-Based Cash Balance Plans, Surfer Leave, Retiree Healthcare, Premium Parking, or Hotel Buybacks—the industry is filled with?customized provisions?that speak to what matters most to each pilot group. That’s why every property bargains independently. 

At Frontier,?schedule flexibility through drop and swap isn’t a loophole—it’s a core part of our pilot group’s identity. Poll after poll has confirmed that Frontier pilots place a high value on flexibility and quality of life. These are not secondary issues; they are foundational. And yet, management, who touts these very work rules when recruiting pilots, insists they must be dismantled as part of an economic package that is?insultingly behind the industry?and?unworthy of serious consideration. Worse still, the very work rules they’re targeting now are the same ones?Frontier pilots successfully fought to protect during the 2008 bankruptcy. If those protections were worth defending during bankruptcy, they are certainly worth defending now. 
 
Management’s Vacation Proposal 
 
Management’s vacation proposal is a textbook example of giving with one hand while taking with the other. In response to ALPA’s proposal to provide a fifth week of vacation for pilots with 15 or more years of service, management agreed, but only with conditions that undercut the entire benefit. They propose reducing the value of a vacation day from 5 hours to 4 hours, a change that would result in a pilot with 11 years of service seeing their four weeks of vacation drop from 140 hours to just 112 hours annually. They also propose vacation accrual occur in hours not days (a concept that is NOT industry standard and doesn’t exist in a single one of our peer carriers’ contracts). This change would decimate the value of our vacation. For example, a pilot that needed to use 17 hours of vacation credit to cover a leave or unexpected sick occurrence, would have their vacation period calculated by taking the available hours, in this case 11, (28- 17= 11) divided by four and rounded down. So, the pilot would receive two days of vacation for the week (11/4 = 2.75 rounded down = 2). Pilots would be required to work more during a vacation month. Rather than improving the contract, management is attempting to gut our current negotiated vacation benefit. This proposal is not only economically regressive, but it is also divisive by design. Vacation is not a luxury. It is a critical part of work-life balance and pilot well-being. Turning a basic benefit into a tradeoff is unacceptable. 
 
Moving Forward 
 
Management has shared that they believe our proposal is outside the zone of reasonableness. The truth is, they’re the ones living in denial and pretending not to see where the rest of the industry has already gone when it comes to this round of pilot contracts. This is not a management that appears to respect its pilot’s contributions. They do not view the largest labor group as a stakeholder. Our CEO continues to send representatives to negotiations who do not have a vision or the authority to make a deal. All airlines are facing uncertainty—economic shifts, fuel volatility, and competitive pressure—but that hasn’t stopped other carriers from reaching agreements that show real commitment to their pilots. Across the industry, pilots have secured historic contracts that honor their contributions and strengthen their futures. Frontier management, on the other hand, is still playing by pre-2020 rules. While our peers prepare to enter new bargaining cycles next year, we’re being asked to trade away quality of life and flexibility for woefully inadequate pay rates. Other pilots are being recognized for their value. We’re being told to take less now and trust them to take care of us later.  
 
If you were here during LOA 67, you remember the promise made in 2011. The agreement stated that if Frontier earned more than a 5% annual pretax profit for two consecutive years, deferred pay raises would be reinstated. If that happened before January 1, 2017, the company was required to negotiate in good faith for further upward pay adjustments based on business conditions. Frontier met the profit targets. But management refused to comply. Instead of honoring the deal, they ignored the obligation entirely while upstreaming hundreds of millions of dollars to Indigo Partners. Pilots kept flying under concessionary terms. Management kept the profits. This wasn’t a failure of structure. It was a refusal to honor an agreement. We won’t give them the opportunity to do it again. 
 
We will be conducting pilot polling from July 21-31 that will confirm what we already know: 

Management is not bargaining with us. 
Management is bargaining against reality. 

Frontier Pilots know our worth. 
Frontier Pilots know what an industry agreement looks like. 
Frontier Pilots will not settle for less than what we’ve earned. 

Management may be content with living in the past; 
Frontier Pilots are Not!  
 
Our next update will take a closer look at?management’s Section 1 – Scope proposal, and the serious risks it poses to the long-term security of this pilot group. 
 
In Unity,